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WITTGENSTEIN TESTS MR. JUSTICE HOLMES: 
ON HOLMES'S PROPOSAL TO SEPARATE 
LEGAL CONCEPTS FROM MORAL CONCEPTS 
THOMAS D. EISELE* 
When Wittgenstein depicts himself being accused 
of "destroying everything of interest and 
importance," he replies, in effect, that if what he has 
done is destructive, what is destroyed cannot have 
been of genuine interest—it was always a house of 
cards. Interest and importance in Philosophical 
Investigations are everywhere to be tested for their 
interest and importance—an ancient demand 
philosophy imposes upon itself, from Plato's 
Republic to Thoreau's Walden. 
—Stanley Cavell' 
Do the comments of Mr. Justice Holmes on American law 
interest us today? Are Holmes's remarks on what law is, or about 
legal education in America and how we might study and learn our 
legal system, important to today's legal world? If Stanley Cavell is 
correct in thinking that philosophy—whether old or new—
demands a say in testing anything that claims our interest, or that 
purports to have a place of importance in our lives, then these 
questions asked of Holmes's writings are genuine philosophical 
queries. 
Similar questions have been pursued Socratically, as is familiar 
from the Apology. In making his defense statement to his jurors, 
Socrates excuses the burden and the imposition that he thrusts 
upon his Athenian neighbors by claiming that both he and his 
neighbors need to examine their lives.2 At his trial for impious 
behavior, Socrates implores his audience to expend the time and 
energy required to discover what interests them and what is truly 
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. Author of 
BITTER KNOWLEDGE: LEARNING SOCRATIC LESSONS OF DISILLUSION AND 
RENEWAL (Univ. Notre Dame Press 2009). 
' STANLEY CAVELL, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, in PHILOSOPHY 
THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW 111, 114 (Harvard Univ. Press 2005). 
2 PLATO, Apology, in THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF SOCRATES 31, 39 [28e-29a, 
38a] (G.M.A. Grube trans., revised by John M. Cooper, 3d ed. Hackett Publ'g 
Co. 2000). 
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important to their community.3 From a more modern perspective, 
however, we can pursue these questions with a Wittgensteinian 
emphasis rather than a Socratic one; that is, we can ask whether 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy might afford us help in assessing 
the interest or the value of one of Holmes's signature remarks 
about the law and its study. 
I. INITIAL BEARINGS 
In the writings that constitute Wittgenstein's later work,4 we 
find the suggestion that much of what troubles us in the 
philosophical inspection of our lives can be traced to our 
misunderstanding how we have expressed ourselves in this world. 
It would not be correct to say that this problematic element is 
simply a matter of misunderstanding language. Rather, 
Wittgenstein implies that clarifying this problematic element may 
require us to investigate and to gain clarity on our relationship with 
our words, with what we say (or are inclined to say, or are tempted 
to say) in certain circumstances. So, for example, in his 
Philosophical Investigations, we find Wittgenstein saying, 
"Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence 
by means of language."5  
I am interested that in this remark, Wittgenstein does not say 
whether he finds language to be our bane or our salvation. If 
philosophy is a battle against the "bewitchment of our 
intelligence," Wittgenstein still does not make clear whether the 
phrase "by means of language" indicates the source of our 
bewitchment (i.e., what causes us to be bewitched), or whether it 
tells us how philosophy combats the bewitchment of our 
intelligence—namely, that we battle our own bewitchment by 
using the therapeutic means that our language makes available to 
US. 
This is a useful equivocation and one perhaps intended by 
Wittgenstein. If I understand this aspect of his later philosophy, 
Wittgenstein is suggesting that language aids and abets us when we 
get in our own way, while simultaneously recognizing that 
language is also the means by which we untangle ourselves. 
Language is one cause of—and one route toward gaining some 
relief from—our ills. Human beings are the language-animal par 
3 Id. at 32-33 [29d-30a, 30a-b]. 
4 These writings date from the 1930s and 1940s, and most were not made 
public until after Wittgenstein's death in 1951. 
5 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 109 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. Macmillan 1968) (1953). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/3
[VOL. 2.252 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 254 
excellence, and we live and form our lives largely within the 
medium of language. Its ills are our ills, its failings are our failings, 
and vice versa. 
This observation marks a point of intimacy between 
Wittgenstein's understanding and Holmes's apparent vision of the 
law. Wittgenstein suggests that we find our way through the world 
with the help of language and that we also lose our way via these 
same means.6 Holmes, too, is sensitive to the role that language 
plays in orienting ourselves with respect to the world. For example, 
in The Path of the Law, Holmes says: 
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, 
and by the mere force of language continually 
invites us to pass from one domain to the other 
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we 
have the boundary constantly before our minds. The 
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and 
intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is 
easier, or, I may say, more common in legal 
reasoning, than to take these words in their moral 
sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop 
into fallacy.' 
We could almost expect to find such a remark among the 
numbered sections of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. 
Here, Holmes is warning us that "the mere force of language 
continually invites us to pass from one domain," the law, "to the 
other," morality, "without perceiving it." We are not watching or 
noticing the semantic difference between legal terms and moral 
terms that share the same spelling, and so we "drop into fallacy." 
We become entangled in our words—despite the fact that these 
words are intended to be helpful—and thus we lose our way. 
For Holmes, the danger in studying the law is that we take over 
words that are used in both the law and moral discourse and forget 
that the uses of these words may be quite different in each domain. 
We confuse or conflate them and fall into fallacy in our legal 
reasoning, treating as a legal attribute something that is actually a 
moral or ethical one. 
Now, compare this Holmesian claim with a famous tag from 
Philosophical Investigations where Wittgenstein casts a thought 
6 Id and accompanying text. 
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
459-60 (1897). 
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very similar to Holmes's: "A picture held us captive. And we 
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."8 For Wittgenstein, we are 
subject to a fixation, an unscrutinized way of taking our words—a 
way of hearing or understanding someone's expressions—and we 
fall into a state of captivity,9 a state of bewitchment.° 
 One reason 
we find it so difficult to avoid this captivation by our words—this 
bewitchment of our intelligence—is that the picture itself, the 
fixation or cliché, "lay in our language and language seemed to 
repeat it to us inexorably."" We cannot get outside our language, 
and so the only way through our problem is by means of the very 
same medium from which our problem stems. 
Holmes asks us to imagine the "force of language continually 
invit[ing] us to pass from one domain to the other without 
perceiving it,"12 while Wittgenstein proposes that we consider the 
thought that a "picture" or fixation "lay in our language and 
language seem[s] to repeat it to us inexorably."13 These twin 
portraits of our domination or entrancement by language are 
remarkably similar. 
There is a further point of intimacy between the views of 
Wittgenstein and of Holmes. At an early juncture in his essay, 
Holmes says: 
The first thing for a business-like understanding 
of the matter is to understand its limits, and 
therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and 
dispel a confusion between morality and law, which 
sometimes arises to the height of conscious theory, 
and more often and indeed constantly is making 
trouble in detail without reaching the point of 
consciousness.I4 
Holmes attributes our lack of understanding and our lack of care in 
observing the limit or boundary between law and morality to 
something we fail to realize. "[M]ore often," Holmes claims, "and 
indeed constantly," this confusion on our part about the boundary 
8 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 115 (emphasis in original). 
9 M 
1° Id § 109. 
11 Id § 115. 
12 Holmes, supra note 7, at 459. See also infra text accompanying note 39 
(where Holmes speaks in terms of "the trap which legal language lays for us"). 
13 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 115. 
14 Holmes, supra note 7, at 459. 
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between law and morality, "is makin trouble in detail without 
reaching the point of consciousness." 1  As I read Holmes, one of 
his central goals in writing his essay (or in delivering his lecture to 
the students at Boston University) was to make us conscious of this 
boundary and to emphasize our need to keep the boundary between 
domains clearly and distinctly before our minds whenever we are 
studying law or thinking about some point of legal right or legal 
duty. 
Wittgenstein, too, wants to make us conscious of something—
something we are apt to forget. In section 109 of the 
Investigations, just before the line about philosophy being a battle 
against our bewitchment, Wittgenstein says the following: 
[P]hilosophical problems . . . . are, of course, not 
empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by 
looking into the workings of our language, and that 
in such a way as to make us recognize those 
workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand 
them. The problems are solved, not by giving new 
information, but by arranging what we have always 
known.16 
And just sections before this point in the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein sets the stage for this conception of 
philosophical problems and their solution: 
Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt out 
new facts; it is, rather, of the essence of our 
investigation that we do not seek to learn anything 
new by it. We want to understand something that is 
already in plain view. For this is what we seem in 
some sense not to understand.I7  
In these remarks, Wittgenstein describes his philosophical 
practice as an attempt to get us to realize or recognize something 
with which we are familiar but which we have a difficult time 
understanding or articulating. Holmes speaks in terms of drawing a 
distinction between law and morality—a distinction with which we 
are already familiar—but one we find difficult to remember or to 
keep present in our consciousness. Holmes says of the conflation 
15 Id 
16 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 109. 
17 1d. § 89,11 b. 
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of this distinction that it "constantly is making trouble in detail 
without reaching the point of consciousness."I8 In a similar vein, 
Wittgenstein says: 
The aspects of things that are most important for 
us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—
because it is always before one's eyes.) The real 
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. 
Unless that fact has at some time struck him.—And 
this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, 
is most striking and most powerful.19 
Both men share the task of getting us to realize or to understand 
something about which we already are familiar, but which is hard 
for us to remember or to keep present and alive in our 
consciousness. 
Where these two men diverge is in their diagnosis of what 
might make us aware of our dormant experience—our unconscious 
knowledge. For Holmes, reaching clarity as to the line or boundary 
between law and morality can be achieved by isolating and 
removing the offending verbiage. Once we enforce this boundary 
by means of excision—cutting, as it were, a clear path between the 
domain of law and the domain of morality—our confusion should 
subside.2°  
For Wittgenstein, however, the solution is not so clear-cut. 
Human frailty and human language being what they are, the 
reduction of confusion is the work of a lifetime. Since we 
repetitively fall into these traps for the unwary, we must 
repetitively climb out of them. 
We want to establish an order in our knowledge 
of the use of language: an order with a particular 
end in view; one out of many possible orders; not 
the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving 
prominence to distinctions which our ordinary 
forms of language easily make us overlook. This 
may make it look as if we saw it as our task to 
reform language. 
18 Holmes, supra note 7, at 459. 
19 WI1TGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 129. 
20 See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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[But i]t is not our aim to refine or complete the 
system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-
of ways. 
. . . . 
. . . Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by 
examples; and the series of examples can be broken 
off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), 
not a single problem.21  
Wittgenstein's sense of closure in dealing with our 
philosophical problems holds out no hope of a solution found and 
achieved once and for all, whereas Holmes seems not only to hope 
for one, but also to promise one. Holmes proposes a project of 
reclamation, reclaiming a clear line of demarcation between law 
and morality. For Wittgenstein, there is no such cure for being a 
fallible human who inherits a native language. 
II. HOLMES'S TUTORIAL FOR LAW STUDENTS 
The Path of the Law is an address originally delivered by 
Holmes to students at Boston University Law School; later, it was 
published in the Harvard Law Review. These events took place 
back in 1897. How is it possible that an address delivered (albeit 
by an esteemed jurist and student of the Anglo-American law) and 
published more than 110 years ago can still interest the American 
legal community in the twenty-first century? 
That Holmes's writing does in fact still interest us is shown by 
some recent events. In 1997, for example, marking the centenary 
of Holmes's lecture, there were several symposia and law review 
issues (even books of commentary) devoted solely to our 
continued fascination with The Path of the Law.22 More recently, 
in a 2006 book called The Canon of American Legal Thought,23 the 
editors (both of whom are Harvard law professors) gave pride of 
place in that volume as the lead essay (and the only essay drawn 
from the nineteenth century) to Holmes's foundational text. 
Empirically speaking, interest in Holmes's remarks on legal 
21 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 5, §§ 132-33. 
22 See, e.g., Symposium, The Path of the Law 100 Years Later: Holmes's 
Influence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1997); see also THE 
PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES, JR. (Steven Burton ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
23 DAVID KENNEDY & WILLIAM FISHER, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT (Princeton Univ. Press 2006). 
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education is still possible within the legal academy in today's 
twenty-first-century world. The question remains: Why? 
Part of our continuing fascination with Holmes's essay may be 
that in this writing, unlike in his formal opinions, Holmes speaks 
not with the voice of a judge, but rather with the voice of a teacher. 
Presenting his thoughts from the perspective of a tutor or teacher 
may well make Holmes less forbidding and more amiable as an 
intellectual companion than when he speaks as an official oracle of 
the law. In this lecture-essay, Holmes offers to the students at 
Boston University his thoughts on how best to study and 
understand the Anglo-American common law system: "I wish, if I 
can, to lay down some first principles for the study of this body of 
dogma or systematized prediction which we call the law . . . ."24 
Another possible factor to account for our continuing interest 
in this piece of nineteenth century writing is Holmes's penchant for 
pithy and memorable claims about the American common law. 
Consider the following aphorisms taken from Holmes's essay: 
[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction 
that if a man does or omits certain things he will be 
made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of 
the court;—and so of a legal right.2  
If you want to know the law and nothing else, 
you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for 
the material consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds 
his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or 
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of 
conscience.26 
The prophecies of what the courts will do in 
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean 
by the law.27  
No concrete proposition is self-evident, no 
matter how ready we may be to accept it . . . .28 
24 Holmes, supra note 7, at 458. 25 
26 Id at 459. 
27 Id at 461. 
28 Id. at 466. 
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It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule 
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds 
upon which it was laid down have vanished long 
since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past.29 
We have too little theory in the law rather than too 
much . . . .3°  
Holmes, in stating his views of the law, knew how to be 
provocative. 
What provokes my interest in The Path of the Law is Holmes's 
claim that we continually court confusion when we conflate legal 
terms with moral terms, and his further claim that to avoid this 
conflation of the legal domain with the moral or ethical universe, 
we should keep these terms separate. Holmes begins his 
presentation of his position with the following remarks: 
The first thing for a business-like understanding 
of the matter is to understand its limits, and 
therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and 
dispel a confusion between morality and law, which 
sometimes rises to the height of conscious theory, 
and more often and indeed constantly is making 
trouble in detail without reaching the point of 
consciousness.31  
The confusion to which Holmes alludes is the conflation of 
words or concepts that are used both in the law and in ethical or 
moral contexts. The terms may look the same, but Holmes reminds 
us that legal terms can, in fact, have meanings different than 
similar-sounding (and similar-looking) moral or ethical terms. 
Given that Holmes wants to make us conscious of this source of 
confusion, what is its importance to us? Holmes believes that 
clarifying and maintaining this distinction has important practical 
and theoretical consequences. 
The practical value of viewing the law in this Holmesian way 
is that such a view reveals the true basis or foundation of law and 
our legal system. Consider this fundamental question: Why does 
29 Id at 469. 
30 Id. at 476. 
31 Id at 459. 
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any person obey the law? Because it is the right thing to do? 
Because we ought to obey it? These responses might be the way an 
ethicist or moral person would answer our fundamental question, 
but Holmes's answer is quite different. He claims a more self-
interested reason for obedience of the law by citizens subject to its 
reach: good persons as well as bad persons obey the law out of 
fear. We fear the power of the state—we fear Leviathan—in that 
we seek to avoid the state-sanctioned punishment that normally 
attends any violation of the law. Holmes puts this point bluntly: 
You can see very plainly that a bad man has as 
much reason [motivation] as a good one for wishing 
to avoid an encounter with the public force, and 
therefore you can see the practical importance of the 
distinction between morality and law. A man who 
cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed 
and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless 
to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay 
money, and will want to keep out of jail if he can.32 
It is an article of faith for Holmes that we humans are motivated by 
a desire to avoid state sanctions. In this regard, every person (good 
man, bad man, rich woman, poor woman) is interested in avoiding 
the application of the state's monopoly on force or coercion. 
It seems only practical, then, to view the law in this 
unpretentious (even cynical) way. And this way of viewing the law 
is exactly what Holmes advocates: 
I have just shown the practical reason for saying 
so. If you want to know the law and nothing else, 
you must look at it as a bad man [i.e., a practical 
person], who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to 
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for 
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in 
the vaguer sanctions of conscience. The theoretical 
importance of the distinction is no less, if you 
would reason on your subject aright.33  
Before we turn to the theoretical importance of Holmes's 
argument, let us review for a moment his practical reason for 
32 
 Id. 
33 Id 
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observing this line between law and morality. If we consider all of 
the people within a legal system who are subject to its dictates, 
then some unknown percentage of those people will be "outlaws" 
or "outsiders"—exemplars of Holmes's paradigmatic "bad man." 
And, according to Holmes, these people care only about the 
material consequences of obeying or violating the law. Other 
people subject to the same legal system may, of course, have an 
"insider" and "internal" perspective on the law; they may obey the 
law because of the dictates of their conscience, or because they 
take law to have a normative hold. But it would seem that all of the 
people involved in a legal system—whether they view the law as 
outsiders or as insiders—will have, at a minimum, the object of 
avoiding the application of the state's force to themselves. 
Holmes's "bad man" standard for understanding legal behavior 
seems practical, then, in the sense that it measures the law in terms 
of the lowest common denominator concerning people's 
motivation for following the law. 
So far, we have considered what Holmes calls the practical 
value of maintaining this distinction between law and morality. 
Now what of the "theoretical importance of this] distinction," 
which Holmes says is "no less [important], if you would reason on 
your subject" correctly? Holmes is not shy about his commitments 
or his priorities in this regard: "I do say that that distinction 
[between law and morals] is of the first importance for the object 
which we are here to consider, —a right study and mastery of the 
law as a business with well understood limits, a body of dogma 
enclosed within definite lines."34 How exactly does Holmes 
specify the theoretical importance of this distinction? He says: 
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, 
and by the mere force of language continually 
invites us to pass from one domain to the other 
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we 
have the boundary constantly before our minds. The 
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and 
intent, and negligence, and so forth, and nothing is 
easier, or, I may say, more common in legal 
reasoning, than to take these words in their moral 
sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop 
into fallacy.35  
34 Id. 
35 Id at 459-60. 
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Holmes avows frequently enough that these common words or 
concepts—"rights," "duties," "malice," "intent," and 
"negligence"—have different meanings or significance, depending 
upon whether these terms are used in the legal world or in the 
world of morality and ethics. For example: "Nowhere is the 
confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the 
law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called 
primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance 
beyond what can be assigned and explained."36 Holmes's claim is 
that if we conflate law with morality, then certain legal concepts 
("rights," "duties," etc.) become "invested with a mystic 
significance," out of all proportion to the actual legal sense or legal 
significance that "can be assigned" to these concepts. Holmes 
seeks to remove the mystification of these legal terms. How does 
he do so? 
Holmes's effort to demystify begins early in his essay, 
although in subsequent pages his initial effort receives a number of 
elaborations: 
The primary rights and duties with which 
jurisprudence busies itself again are nothing but 
prophecies. —One of the many evil effects of the 
confusion between legal and moral ideas, about 
which I shall have something to say in a moment, is 
that theory is apt to get the cart before the horse, 
and to consider the right or the duty as something 
existing apart from and independent of the 
consequences of its breach, to which certain 
sanctions are added afterward. But, as I shall try to 
show, a legal duty so called is nothing but a 
prediction that if a man does or omits certain things 
he will be made to suffer in this or that way by 
judgment of the court; —and so of a legal right. '7  
For Holmes, what makes a duty a legal duty is the relative 
predictability that its breach or violation will have the material 
consequence of the application of a state-imposed sanction. And 
what makes a right a legal right, for Holmes, is the relative 
predictability that its assertion or enforcement will have the 
material consequence of the application of a state-imposed 
sanction against any person or entity infringing that right. 
36 1d. at 462. 
37 Id at 458. 
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In The Path of the Law, Holmes eternally returns to this 
reductionist view of legal rights and legal duties. His view reduces 
such rights and duties to their external or material consequences in 
terms of the application or non-application of state-imposed 
sanctions. This element in Holmes's tutorial vision of the law 
evidences his faith in scientific progress, his sense that we need 
external and objective measures of the law. According to Holmes, 
we need to focus our attention on those aspects of phenomena that 
we can scientifically test, measure, and confirm (or disconfirm). 
Holmes adheres in this regard to the nineteenth century's faith in 
scientific progress and scientific understanding in all things 
human. 
About the law in general, Holmes makes a similar (if more 
general) reductionist proposal: 
The confusion with which I am dealing besets 
confessedly legal conceptions. Take the 
fundamental question, What constitutes the law? 
You will find some text writers telling you that it is 
something different from what is decided by the 
courts . . . , that it is a system of reason, that it is a 
deduction from principles of ethics or admitted 
axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide 
with the decisions. But if we take the view of our 
friend the bad man we shall find that he does not 
care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but 
that he does want to know what the . . . courts are 
likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The 
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the 
law." 
What, then, is Holmes's theoretical solution for this problem—this 
threatened confusion? How would Holmes bring clarity to this 
situation? 
He continues to elaborate his modest proposal: 
I hope that my illustrations have shown the danger, 
both to speculation [theory] and to practice, of 
confounding morality with law, and the trap which 
legal language lays for us on that side of our way. 
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not 
38 Id at 460-61. 
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be a gain if every word of moral significance could 
be banished from the law altogether, and other 
words adopted which should convey legal ideas 
uncolored by anything outside the law. We should 
lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and 
the majesty got from ethical associations, but by 
ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we 
should gain very much in the clearness of our 
thought.39 
It is hard to know just how serious Holmes's suggestion is, but 
let us consider its two parts literally. First, we are to rid ourselves 
of ("banish") what Holmes calls "every word of moral significance 
. . . from the law." Short of collective amnesia, it is difficult to 
conceive how this project might be accomplished. How exactly are 
we to eliminate these words from our legal textbooks and from the 
vocabulary of the law? Second, Holmes (perhaps more seriously) 
proposes that we "adopt" new words—new terms—which carry 
with them no moral or ethical connotations. This is a fairly 
common suggestion made in the abstract when we humans wish to 
clean up the seeming clutter of some area of our complicated lives 
and language. But how often do we truly invent new words, 
especially words without "extraneous" connotations (what Holmes 
calls "other words . . . uncolored by anything outside the law")? 
And even if we were to engage in such linguistic invention, once 
we were to begin to use these new words and concepts, it remains 
unclear how they should be able to withstand or avoid the natural 
tendency of words to collect associations within our language. 
These associations would inevitably include, I should think, ethical 
or moral connections insofar as our uses of these words refer to or 
connect with the ethical or moral elements in our lives. 
Holmes seems oblivious to the difficulties inherent in the 
actual implementation of his proposal. Rather, he blithely 
recommends its beneficial consequences in terms of clarifying our 
minds and our view of the Anglo-American common law. How 
might we go about this process of "ridding ourselves of an 
unnecessary confusion" that would enable us to "gain very much in 
the clearness of our thought?"4° Earlier in his address, Holmes 
says: "You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty 
shrinks and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it 
with cynical acid and expel everything except the object of our 
39 Id. at 464. 
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study, the operations of the law."41 "But," Holmes adds in a forlorn 
tone, "such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of 
those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law 
as they can."42 
As students of the law, we are advised by Holmes to avoid 
making a mystery of the law. When we study the law, Holmes 
says, we are apt to become confused if we fail to notice or mark 
"the confusion between legal and moral ideas." This confusion in 
our legal terms or concepts will be dissipated to the extent that we 
are able to "assign" (or "explain") a more precise "significance" to 
such terms or concepts. Holmes supposes that the precise legal 
meaning or significance of various terms and ideas in the law does 
not include any moral connotations or implications. Therefore, 
Holmes proposes we clarify the practice of law by ridding legal 
concepts of their moral counterparts—their moral "look-alikes"— 
and turning law into a strictly scientific study: "You see how the 
vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same 
time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and 
expel everything except the object of our study, the operations of 
the law."43  
I take it, then, that Mr. Justice Holmes wants to study law by 
isolating it as the object of our attention, thereby intentionally 
excluding all of the law's relations from its others (other practices, 
other phenomena, other concepts). What might Wittgenstein say 
about this modest proposal by Holmes? 
III. WITTGENSTEIN ON CRITERIA AND LANGUAGE-GAMES 
The vision of language in Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
conflicts with Holmes's suggestion. Holmes wants us to draw or 
enforce his preferred distinction by keeping legal terms separate 
from moral terms. This enforced separation, from Wittgenstein's 
perspective, would likely lead us to fail in reaching Holmes's 
objective (i.e., clarification of meaning, reduction of confusion). 
Put another way, from Wittgenstein's perspective, Holmes's 
proposal is self-defeating. We could not sustain the distinction that 
Holmes wishes us to draw if we were to follow his proposed 
advice to keep separate legal terms from moral terms. Why not? 
Because if—as Wittgenstein suggests—our words draw their 
41 Id. at 461-62. 
42 Id. at 462. 
43 Id. at 461-62. 
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meaning from the other words with which they are associated and 
are "at home," and if our words receive their semantic identity 
from the contexts in which they are used (contexts and cases 
Wittgenstein calls our "language-games"), then to separate our 
words from one another will only produce semantic emptiness, not 
semantic clarity. 
To separate terms in our language from their associated terms, 
or to attempt to substitute semantically neutral or "uncolored" 
terms for semantically-laden terms, would be to render those words 
not clear or unambiguous, but rather senseless. They would lack 
the very semantic connections or conceptual relations that give our 
words meaning. Therefore, if we were to follow Holmes's advice, 
our actions would empty the words of the very content that Holmes 
imagines himself striving to retain and to keep distinct). 
In Part I of this article, I adduced some of Wittgenstein's 
thoughts about our getting in our own way by entangling ourselves 
and our minds in the workings of language, or by becoming 
bewitched by the intricacies of our words and concepts. Now I 
want to say something further about this aspect of Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy. 
In section 109 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
tells us that philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence, and then in section 115 he remarks that in the grip of 
philosophical puzzlement, we may be held captive by something 
he calls a "picture." Here, Wittgenstein seems to be describing our 
situation or condition as one in which we are mesmerized by 
words—entranced by our own thoughts about matters. In such a 
fix, what does Wittgenstein recommend? 
He immediately follows these remarks in the Investigations 
with very specific advice: 
When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", 
"being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" —and 
try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in 
this way in the language-game which is its original 
home?— 
What we do is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use." 
44 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 116. 
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Wittgenstein recommends bringing our minds (and ourselves) back 
from the realm of metaphysics by bringing our words back from 
that same realm. We are counseled to ask ourselves whether the 
word that is giving us trouble is "ever actually used in this way in 
the language-game which is its original home?" This passage 
suggests that our minds run astray as and when our words go 
astray. And it implies that it is up to us to corral our words, or to 
shepherd them back into their ordinary contexts, their everyday 
modes of being and existence. We cannot understand ourselves or 
the world without understanding our language, and it is our 
language that is the home-ground of our understanding. We must 
bring our words back home—back home to us, where we live, 
back to ourselves in our ordinary lives. This, too, is where our 
words live and make sense. 
In section 116 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein avers that 
words have "language-games" that are the original home for those 
word. What Wittgenstein means by "language-game" is contested 
in the critical literature, but at a minimum it seems to involve a 
conception of language that is in some sense holistic or contextual. 
To understand a word or term or concept, we must understand the 
cases or contexts in which it is used, and into which it can be 
projected. Such contexts include both other words and the events 
and actions surrounding our words and deeds. 
At one point in his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
lists some sample language-games. Among those he mentions are 
the following: "Giving orders, and obeying them— Describing the 
appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— Reporting 
an event— Speculating about an event— Forming and testing a 
hypothesis . . . Guessing riddles— Making a joke; telling it . . . 
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying."4  And in addition to 
these specific linguistic activities, we might even speak of the 
language-game of naming, or the language-game of pain, or the 
language-game of describing, or the language-game of love. In this 
regard, we would be referring to some collection of human 
activities, expressions, and phenomena that Wittgenstein calls "the 
whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven:46 This particular aspect of Wittgenstein's vision of 
language emphasizes that speaking and writing are as much 
matters of human action as they are matters of human expression. 
As Wittgenstein puts it, "Here the term 'language-game' is meant 
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to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life."47 And, of course, 
Wittgenstein is known for having said: "For a large class of 
cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 
`meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use 
in the language."48 In parsing this proposed definition or 
characterization of the meaning of a word, it seems important to 
recognize that Wittgenstein's vision remains holistic or contextual. 
He is, after all, speaking about the meaning of a word as being a 
function of the word's use in the language. Of what else does our 
language consist besides the associated terms, expressions, and 
actions that—taken together, holistically—we use in making 
ourselves heard, in expressing ourselves, and in communicating 
with others? 
This brief commentary on language-games is cursory, I realize, 
but I must be equally abrupt in sketching Wittgenstein's other 
signature concepts—"grammar" and "criteria"—as they relate to 
our project of trying to test Holmes's remark about separating legal 
concepts from moral concepts. I am going to rely upon a single 
passage, one drawn from The Blue Book, which consists of a set of 
lecture notes that Wittgenstein prepared for his students at 
Cambridge University in the 1930s: 
We said that it was a way of examining the 
grammar (the use) of the word "to know", to ask 
ourselves what, in the particular case we are 
examining, we should call "getting to know". There 
is a temptation to think that this question is only 
vaguely relevant, if relevant at all, to the question: 
"what is the meaning of the word 'to know'?" We 
seem to be on a side-track when we ask the question 
"What is it like in this case 'to get to know'?" But 
this question really is a question concerning the 
grammar of the word "to know", and this becomes 
clearer if we put it in the form: "What do we call 
`getting to know'?" It is part of the grammar of the 
word "chair" that this is what we call "to sit on a 
chair", and it is part of the grammar of the word 
"meaning" that this is what we call "explanation of 
a meaning"; in the same way to explain my criterion 
for another person's having toothache is to give a 
47 1d. § 23, If b. 
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grammatical explanation about the word 
"toothache" and, in this sense, an explanation 
concerning the meaning of the word "toothache."49 
In the second half of this quotation, Wittgenstein suggests that 
one aspect of the concept of a chair is that we can use such an 
object to sit on. Similarly, one aspect of the concept of "meaning" 
is that we can explain the meaning of a word or concept; we give 
and receive explanations of someone's meaning (what he or she 
means by a particular word; what they meant by what they said; 
etc.). And, of course, sometimes, despite our best efforts, our 
attempted explanations of the meaning of a word fail. Wittgenstein 
goes on to say, "to explain my criterion for another person's 
having toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the 
word toothache.'"5°  
"Criteria," in Wittgenstein's sense—or, as Stanley Cavell calls 
them in The Claim of Reason: "Wittgensteinian" or "grammatical" 
criteria51—help us to understand the grammar of our words and 
concepts by characterizing those words and concepts and their 
uses. It is part of the concept of "chair" that we sit on a chair. 
Hence, in our grammar, the concept "chair" is tied to or associated 
with, and therefore characterized by, the concept "sit" (or "sit on"). 
This is why, in summing up one portion of his presentation on 
Wittgensteinian criteria, Cavell says that "`Wittgensteinian criteria 
do not relate a name to an object, but various concepts to the 
concept of that object.' I could also have said: They establish the 
position of the concept of an 'object' in our system of concepts."52 
How do Wittgensteinian criteria manage to do this? 
Cavell indicates that Wittgensteinian criteria relate a series or 
number of words (concepts) to the concept of an object by forming 
a language-game. In this respect, Wittgensteinian or grammatical 
criteria afford us the terms by which we approach any given 
concept. "[C]riteria are the means by which we learn what our 
concepts are."53 These associated words are the linguistic means by 
which we come to know and use the concept in question—the 
49 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 23-24 (Harper & 
Row 1958). 
513 M. 
51 STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 72 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979) 
("Wittgensteinian or (as I will now begin calling them) grammatical criteria are 
not marks or features which require special training or a specialized 
environment to have mastered, whereas Austinian (non-grammatical) criteria 
do"). 
52 Id. at 76. 
53 1d. at 16. 
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concept sketched and staked out by the terms with which this 
concept is associated (and by which the concept is characterized). 
So, for example, Cavell notes: "Where 'call' comes in there, it 
introduces a phrase in which the word to be explained is used; i.e., 
it associates a concept with other concepts." 34 The grammatical 
criteria of a concept form its conditions of employment and its 
conditions of intelligibility in the sense that its aggregate 
conceptual associates are the means by which we learn (by which 
we come to know) this concept, and by which we come to use this 
concept within our lives and our language. 
Cavell illustrates his reconstructive reading of Wittgenstein by 
way of an extended example concerning our concept of a chair: 
"It is part of the grammar of the word 'chair' 
that this is what we call 'to sit on a chair'. . . ." That 
you use this object that way, sit on it that way, is 
our criterion for calling it a chair. You can sit on a 
cigarette, or on a thumb tack, or on a flag pole, but 
not in that way. Can you sit on a table or a tree 
stump in that (the "grammatical") way? Almost; 
especially if they are placed against a wall. That is, 
you can use a table or a stump as a chair (a place to 
sit; a seat) in a way you cannot use a tack as a chair. 
But so can you use a screw-driver as a dagger; that 
won't make a screw-driver a dagger. What can serve 
as a chair is not a chair, and nothing would (be said 
to) serve as a chair if there were no (were nothing 
we called) (orthodox) chairs. We could say: It is 
part of the grammar of the word "chair" that this is 
what we call "to serve as a chair." 
The force of such remarks is something like 
this: If you don't know all this, and more, you don't 
know what a chair is; what "chair" "means"; what 
we call a chair; what it is you would be certain of 
(or almost certain of, or doubt very much) if you 
were certain (or almost certain, or doubt very much) 
that something is a chair.55  
54 
 Id. at 70. Cavell's reference to the term "call" is his further specification 
of some of the implications in the quotation from THE BLUE BOOK, supra note 
49. 
55 Id. at 71. 
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We come to learn what the word "chair" means in our 
language, as well as what a chair is in our world, by coming to 
know these little things—these seemingly insignificant (or barely 
significant) facts—about what we say about chairs and how we use 
chairs. And notice that in Cavell's example, there are certain 
associated or cognate concepts repeatedly tied with our use of the 
word "chair"—concepts such as "serve," "sit," "place," "seat," and 
so on. These ordinary words or concepts are what we humans use 
in characterizing what we understand or take to be a chair in our 
world and our language. 
Our words and concepts have their place or "home" among the 
myriad relations and connections that constitute our language. And 
so we find Wittgenstein saying: "When philosophers use a word—
`knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition', `name'—and try 
to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is 
the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game 
which is its original home?"56 When we allow ourselves to speak 
(or when we find ourselves driven or forced to speak) outside of 
our normal, natural language-games, then we are apt to allow 
ourselves to say something that we do not (and cannot) mean there 
and then. On such occasions, although we have the illusion of 
making sense, we are speaking emptily or, as Wittgenstein puts it 
early on in the Investigations, we are speaking "outside of a 
particular language-game."57 This domestic imagery suggests that 
our words are tethered to the world by means of the criteria we 
have for their use and invocation. So, too, we tether ourselves (our 
minds and our bodies) to the world through our use and invocation 
of our words. This is how we humans fashion a haven in this 
world. 
IV. TESTING HOLMES'S MODEST PROPOSAL 
I mentioned earlier that Holmes states in The Path of the Law 
that legal terms have different meanings than similar-looking 
moral terms. How does Holmes know this? In other words, what 
linguistic or grammatical knowledge does Holmes have in this 
regard, and where did he come into its possession? Or put another 
way, consider this: When the word "duty" (or the word "right") 
appears in a sentence in English, how does Holmes know—and 
how do we know—whether that word is being used in its legal 
sense or in its moral sense? If you ask yourself these questions, I 
56 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 116, ¶ a. 
57 1d. § 47, ij d. 
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think you'll respond by saying that his knowledge (and our 
knowledge) of such matters is based upon the other words 
associated with the key word, as well as the context in which these 
words are used or into which these words are being projected. In 
Wittgenstein's lingo, these two factors are roughly what he means 
by his critical vocabulary, "criteria" and "language-games." 
I realize that eventually Holmes wishes to translate or reduce 
the meaning of legal terms to their external signs or material 
consequences.58 Yet initially, in grouping or categorizing the 
similar-looking terms into different classes of legal uses and moral 
or ethical uses, Holmes does not—and we do not—use any such 
material bases for distinguishing or classifying these terms. 
Instead, he uses—and we use—the ordinary linguistic criteria and 
our intuitive sense of contextual propriety that we inherit and 
develop when we become initiates of a natural language as one of 
its native speakers. 
To test my contention, I would like to consider at slightly 
greater length a few argumentative points that Holmes makes in 
favor of his preferred way of understanding the Anglo-American 
common law system. Remember the remark from Holmes that 
[t]he law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, 
and by the mere force of language continually 
invites us to pass from one domain to the other 
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we 
have the boundary constantly before our minds. The 
law talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and 
intent, and negligence, and so forth . . .59  
This list of five terms roughly parallels the series of examples 
and cases that Holmes invokes later in his essay as a way of 
instructing us about the need to draw the distinction between law 
and morality. Here, rather than considering all five instances, let us 
limit ourselves to two of Holmes's most elaborate examples 
offered in support of his argument. 
First, consider what Holmes says about rights, both moral and 
legal: 
For instance, when we speak of the rights of man in 
a moral sense, we mean to mark the limits of 
58 Holmes, supra note 7, at 460-61; see also supra text accompanying notes 
37-38. 
59 Holmes, supra note 7, at 459-60. 
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interference with individual freedom which we 
think are prescribed by conscience, or our ideal, 
however reached. Yet it is certain that many laws 
have been enforced in the past, and it is likely that 
some are enforced now, which are condemned by 
the most enlightened opinion of the time, or which 
at all events pass the limit of interference as many 
consciences would draw it. Manifestly, therefore, 
nothing but confusion of thought can result from 
assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are 
equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and 
the law.6°  
In speaking about "the rights of man in a moral sense," Holmes 
uses, in this context at least, the following several associated words 
or cognate phrases: he says that moral rights deal with "limits of 
interference" as to "individual freedom" which we think are 
"prescribed" by "conscience," or our "ideal." Holmes uses these 
specific terms to characterize the notion of human rights in its 
moral or ethical dimension. Holmes's invocation of these terms 
confirms Wittgenstein's claim that we rely on our criteriological 
cognate concepts, along with the contexts ("language-games") in 
which we use them (or refuse to use them), as the means by which 
we make meaning through the medium of our language. 
It appears to me that—in practice—Holmes uses the 
grammatical tools that Wittgenstein would suggest we all have and 
use in coming to a fuller consciousness of the resources and riches 
of our inherited language (including our inherited language of the 
Anglo-American common law). I am suggesting that these five 
aspects of human rights, taken cumulatively, help us to identify 
one notion of human rights as having a place or a function within a 
moral or ethical ambit. I should note, however, that I am not saying 
that any one of these five associated concepts or phrases is solely 
moral in its semantic influence or effect. It remains true (and is 
equally important to note) that some or all of these same five 
concepts may also have a place or function in a legal universe as 
well. That is, these same words or concepts can do work in the law 
as they do in morality. Indeed, the similarity of use (or of operation 
or function) is what makes it possible to conflate these words in the 
first place. 
At this stage in our understanding of these words, no one thing 
that Holmes has shown us has been decisive with regard to our 
60 Id. at 460. 
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ability to draw a line between a moral orbit and a legal orbit for the 
concept of "the rights of man."61 All I wish to claim here is that it 
is through the use or invocation of these five key words or phrases 
that Holmes is able to so much as draw his distinction and make 
his point vis-à-vis moral rights being distinct from legal rights (on 
at least some occasions, in at least some contexts). The words or 
concepts that Holmes invokes—not the material consequences or 
any other "external" indicia—allow him to propound his plausible 
claim that the "same" words or concepts have different meanings 
in moral contexts than they have in legal contexts. 
Similarly, consider how Holmes speaks about the concept of 
malice (again, with regard to both its moral and its legal 
dimensions): 
I mentioned, as other examples of the use by the 
law of words drawn from morals, malice, intent, 
and negligence. It is enough to take malice as it is 
used in the law of civil liability for wrongs, —what 
we lawyers call the law of torts, —to show you that 
it means something different in law from what it 
means in morals, and also to show how the 
difference has been obscured by giving to principles 
which have little or nothing to do with each other 
the same name. . . .[I]n my opinion at least, the 
word ["malice" as used in the law of torts] means 
nothing about motives, or even about the 
defendant's attitude toward the future, but only 
signifies that the tendency of his conduct under the 
known circumstances was very plainly to cause the 
plaintiff temporal harm.62 
As to this apparent distinction between malice in a moral sense 
and malice in a legal sense, Holmes once again relies implicitly 
upon an appeal to certain associated concepts. Moments later in his 
essay, for example, Holmes states: "Morals deal with the actual 
internal state of the individual's mind, what he actually intends."63  
In connecting this remark with Holmes's preceding attempt to 
distinguish between a moral and a legal connotation of the word 
"malice," we can see that in Holmes's formulation set forth in the 
text accompanying footnote 62, he explicitly dissociates the 
61 Id. at 460 and accompanying text. 
62 Id at 463. 
63 Id 
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concepts of motivation and mental attitude from legal malice. 
Negating these conceptual cognates of moral malice makes 
plausible Holmes's assertion concerning the difference between 
the moral signification and the legal signification of the word 
"malice." 
In fact, I believe that these associated concepts are what help us 
to conjure up either the moral or the legal world into which the 
word "malice" might be intelligibly projected (when, that is, we 
are invoking the concept of malice in terms of considering or 
judging a person's actions to be either malicious or not). Again, 
these Wittgensteinian conceptual criteria (to which Holmes refers 
as he attempts to draw his distinction) seem to be the actual socio-
linguistic bases on which Holmes unwittingly relies in order to 
make his point. 
V. DRAWING A MORAL 
Holmes could not do what he claims to want to do 
	 draw a 
clear distinction between legal terms and moral terms—without 
invoking the grammatical, criteriological means that ordinary 
language makes available to us. Holmes also says that he wants to 
expel such material from our language, as though that would 
clarify things, but ridding ourselves of such socio-linguistic 
material would only blind us. It would remove the bases we have 
for drawing the distinction in the first place. This distinction is not 
merely theoretical; it exists in our lives and in our actual language. 
Perhaps it makes sense, then, that we should avail ourselves of the 
living conceptual material by which the distinction maintains its 
thriving existence. 
To the extent that Holmes advises us, or his student audience, 
to ignore the conceptual associations that the concept of law has 
(associations, for example, that it may have with the concept of 
morality or other concepts in ethics), Holmes is telling us to ignore 
the actual conceptual relations and connections—the grammatical 
criteria—that can inform us about the nature of the concept of law: 
When I emphasize the difference between law and 
morals I do so with reference to a single end, that of 
learning and understanding the law. For that 
purpose you must definitely master its specific 
marks, and it is for that [reason] that I ask you for 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the moment to imagine yourselves indifferent to 
other and greater things.64 
Holmes's plea for a studied "indifference" misconceives how 
we might ever achieve a more clear understanding of the concept 
of law (or its associated conceptual cognates). In effect, Holmes 
asks us to shun exactly the kind of grammatical knowledge to 
which I referred earlier in my discussion of Wittgenstein's later 
work. Holmes wants us to rid ourselves of these criteria, because 
they complicate (he says "confuse") our understanding. But do 
they? Or are they, instead, the only means available for clarifying 
our minds and dissipating our confusion? The latter response is, I 
think, what Wittgenstein would care to maintain. 
Holmes's modest proposal that "every word of moral 
significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other 
words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by 
anything outside the law"65 expresses a tempting fantasy—one that 
promises clarity. This is an attractive, even seductive offer. If we 
were to follow Holmes's advice, however, we would thereby lose 
the conceptual relations and connections that keep our concept of 
law in balance and in play. From Holmes's perspective, such a loss 
seems small indeed: "We should lose the fossil records of a good 
deal of history and the majesty got from ethical associations, but 
by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain 
very much in the clearness of our thought."66 Would that it were 
true. The "fossil records," the "ethical associations," the 
"unnecessary" complexity or confusion of terms are all another 
way of describing the grammatical criteria that we have for guiding 
ourselves and our concepts through this complicated life and world 
of ours. 
Stanley Cavell describes the alternative vision of language that 
we find in Wittgenstein's later philosophy: 
Wittgenstein's idea of a criterion [is used by 
Wittgenstein] . . . . in connection with his idea of 
grammar, to describe, in a sense to explain, how 
language relates (to) things, how things fall under 
our concepts, how we individuate things and name, 
settle on nameables, why we call things as we do—
questions of how we determine what counts as 
m Id. at 459. 
65 Id. at 464. 
66 m. 
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instances of our concepts, this thing as a table, that 
as a chair, this other as a human, that other as a god. 
To speak is to say what counts.67 
Wittgenstein would, as I understand him, reject Holmes's 
counsel to shun our criteria for the employment of our legal and 
moral concepts. To tell these concepts apart, or to draw the very 
distinctions that Holmes wishes us to draw, we must consult the 
specific indicia—the conceptual associations, the fossil records of 
our language (as memorialized and catalogued, for example, in the 
Oxford English Dictionary), and the linguistic connections—that 
Holmes wishes us to rid ourselves of. 
Wittgenstein's counter-counsel is daunting. It reminds us that 
there is no easy means of clarifying our thought—no short-cut to 
achieving clarity. Instead, by reminding ourselves of what we say 
in various circumstances, we once again must try to "bring words 
back from their metaphysical to their everyday use," and thereby 
re-locate the concepts that puzzle us by re-situating those concepts 
within the "original language-games" that form their home.68 In 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the repetitive work of clarification 
is interminable, at least in the sense in which (as Cavell puts it) 
"nothing short of the powers of each word in the language is 
sufficient to understand the powers of language."69 
Taking Holmes's advice would remove from the scene and our 
language the very means by which we daily continue to draw the 
line between law and morality (a line which Holmes wishes us to 
maintain). From Wittgenstein's perspective, as I read him, to do 
without these means would be to do without our ordinary lives and 
our ordinary world, including the world of Anglo-American 
common law. 
67 STANLEY CAVELL, IN QUEST OF THE ORDINARY: LINES OF SKEPTICISM 
AND ROMANTICISM 86 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1988). 
68 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
69 Stanley Cavell, Foreword to NORTHROP FRYE, A NATURAL PERSPECTIVE 
ix, xiv (Columbia Univ. Press 1995) (1965). 
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